

TS# 174768

8 June 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: White House Meeting on Laos,  
8 June 1964, 3:15 pm

Present:

The President (after the first hour)  
Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler,  
Mr. McNaughton, Department of Defense  
Governor Harriman, Mr. U.A. Johnson,  
Mr. W. Bundy, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Manning, State  
Mr. Forrestal, White House  
General Carter, Mr. Colby, Mr. Cooper

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1. Secretary McNamara indicated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider Ambassador Unger's telegram (attached) and to reconsider the action that was contemplated for tonight.

2. Governor Harriman pointed out that he had just reached Secretary Rusk by phone and that the Secretary, considering all the pros and cons, felt that, on balance, the action should proceed. Harriman acknowledged that the Secretary felt somewhat less sanguine about the action than he, Johnson, and Bundy did, although they too felt that there were many risks involved. The big question in Rusk's mind appeared to be whether we would lose Souvanna. Secretary Rusk insisted the President see Unger's telegram before making his decision.

3. Secretary McNamara and Bundy pointed out that Unger's views which were so strongly opposed to the action, were made on the basis of an incomplete briefing and that Unger in fact did not realize when he prepared the telegram that it was a "one shot operation." Although Unger has been forwarded a more complete description of the operation, he has not yet had an opportunity to respond. It was pointed out also, that Unger did not realize that no Napalm would be used.

4. Harriman went on to say that we must signal our intent to Hanoi or the Polish conversations, the Seaborn talks in Hanoi, or our own threats will be meaningless. In response to a question as to the effect on Souvanna Phouma (a question which the President was to raise very emphatically subsequently), Harriman felt that on balance that it would not.

5. In response to a suggestion made by Unger that the Laotian T-28's undertake the task of knocking out the AA installations, McNamara said that it was absolutely impossible for Laotian pilots and T-28's to do the job.

6. In response to a question from General Carter about what would happen if we lost one or more planes on this operation, Secretary McNamara said that we would "up the military pressure." McNamara went on to say that if we knocked out the site but lost the plane, we would regard it as a successful operation, or if we did not knock out the site but did not lose a plane, we would settle for that. McNamara and the others felt that there was no point in delaying the operation for 24 hours or more, "we won't know any more than we know now."

7. General Carter pointed out that the action contemplated seemed to be telescoping the scenario for both Laos and South Vietnam and wondered whether this particular action was worth changing our whole approach to both Laos and South Vietnam. General Carter indicated he felt the action should be stood down. Mr. McNamara and Governor Harriman pointed out here that the Director had indicated his approval for the operation.

8. Bundy and others said that the scenarios are likely not to be affected; the pressures could be held at bay. In any case, it was felt that the scenarios for both Laos and South Vietnam should allow for reactions to military attacks and that we should respond with our own military pressures. Forrestal asked what would happen if we stopped our low-level flights (as apparently is contemplated if this operation is "successful"). McNamara indicated that although the low-level flights provide valuable coverage, we could probably get along without them for as long as a month.

9. At this point the President entered the room.

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Mr. Harriman summarized the fact that we had received a message from Ambassador Unger suggesting a suspension of escorts but that both State and DOD recommend that we go ahead with the program for today. He commented that there are risks in the situation but it is more important to get the signal to Hanoi of our determination than the difficulties we might have in Vientiane. He said that Secretary Rusk agreed with this recommendation although he also admitted that it was a close question. The President asked for a full reading of Ambassador Unger's telegram, commenting that it raised grave doubts in his mind as to the course of action we are undertaking. Mr. McNamara interposed that Mr. Unger did not realize that we were talking of a one-shot operation against the anti-aircraft battery and that it fits into our overall scenario of military steps to take with regard to Laos and South Vietnam. The President indicated a desire for Ambassador Unger's reaction to the entire program.

10. Mr. Forrestal then read Vientiane Embassy telegram 1559. The President asked whether it was or was not true that we had agreed with Souvanna Phouma not to mention U.S. involvement in escort and actual shooting. It developed in the conversation that Ambassador Unger may have had some kind of understanding on this with Souvanna but that this had not been approved by Washington and that it was impractical; further that if no plane had been lost we would not have admitted U.S. participation but that when one was shot down the Department was compelled to go further. With respect to Ambassador Unger's Embassy telegram 1562, Mr. McNamara commented that we have reduced our photo flights from ten to one per day, he also commented that the action against the anti-aircraft battery is a one-shot proposition. The President asked whether it would be feasible for the RLAF to take out this anti-aircraft. Mr. McNamara said that it was not feasible.

11. The President asked whether this action would not be a violation of the Geneva Accords and launch us on a new course. Mr. Harriman replied that the Communists have not abided by the Accords since the start and that we are merely trying to collect the information the ICC has been unable to obtain. He said that this information is important as it can provide us warning of possible Communist moves to the Mekong. He said that Souvanna Phouma was consulted on the photo overflights and fully accepted them and has been informed of the fact that they are being escorted, without particular reaction from him. Another reason for carrying out the action is that it is a signal to the North Vietnamese showing the limits of U.S. acceptance of their actions; unless this is done the U.S. becomes non-credible in their view.

12. The President asked whether the gain we expected in this attack would

be worth the U.S. violation of the Geneva Accords. He also questioned whether it might lead to Souvanna Phouma's quitting. There was some discussion as to whether or not it was an actual violation of the Accords. Secretary McNamara saying that a very good argument could be made that it was not a real violation because of the previous Viet Minh violations. Mr. McNamara stated that he disagreed with Ambassador Unger's cables along the following line: He said the ICC had failed and that the Pathet Lao had moved against the non-Communist elements. He said that Souvanna Phouma had approved the reconnaissance and knew of its being escorted and that it would possibly result in their returning any fire they might receive. He stated that there was no violation of the Accords or at least there was a big difference between our and the Communist violations. He pointed out that the British had been informed of the escort and have not objected.

13. The President commented that in spite of all of this, in the eyes of the world we would be violating the Accords. He commented that this troubled him and asked whether it did not trouble the others. He was concerned that we would lose our position vis-a-vis the world and that we might also lose Souvanna Phouma. He asked what is the overall program; after we take out the battery, then what do we do. Governor Harriman said that we would then suspend the reconnaissance but would take the other military steps in our scenario. The President asked whether the attack would blow the Zurich meeting. Governor Harriman said that there was a chance that it would but that if the attack were not made there would be no progress at the meeting anyway. Mr. McNamara then commented that he was not concerned about progress at the meeting, which is not really expected, but how to prevent further deterioration of the situation in Laos. He then commented that "I don't know" what to do to strengthen the situation there, but he did know that if our strength were not shown, further deterioration would take place.

14. The President asked what would be done if the enemy should knock down several of the planes attacking. Mr. McNamara said that other military moves along the lines of the scenario would be taken. Governor Harriman felt that we would be risking less even should the Polish meeting turn out to be a failure than we would by the likelihood of a Pathet Lao advance. The President asked whether this action would be worth the loss of Souvanna Phouma. Governor Harriman admitted that it would not, but he said that he did not think that this would happen. Mr. McNamara commented that Ambassador Unger was not aware that we were talking only about a one-shot operation; the President asked whether further actions might likely develop in any case.

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15. Mr. Forrestal requested what the implications of postponing the operation twenty-four hours to get Ambassador Unger's reaction would be. Governor Harriman said that there would be no great loss. Mr. McNamara said that this would weaken our negotiating posture with Hanoi. He commented that Mr. Seaborne of the Canadian delegation of the ICC is proceeding to Hanoi with a tough statement in the next few days and that if we back off from a strong position, he should not give this tough statement.

16. The President then went out of the room for a moment. Mr. McNamara expressed his concern at the problem of our acting weakly and talking strongly. He cited the President's "dangerous game" speech, the instructions to the Canadians, and Secretary Rusk's comments in New Delhi and Japan. He said he was prepared to give up Southeast Asia or to act but that in this case we could not go ahead with strong statements and then have no plans to act. Governor Harriman agreed with this saying that he did not see what else we could do.

17. The President then returned and Mr. McNamara repeated his comments about talking toughly but not acting in that manner and reiterated the need to change the instructions to the Canadians if we do not go ahead. He stated that he felt it most dangerous to deal in any such way with the Chinese, and that if we are not prepared to stand up we should stop strong talking. Governor Harriman said that he felt that Souvanna Phouma may well criticize our actions for the record but that he would not necessarily quit his job, and might indeed feel strengthened by a strong U.S. position. He stated that he felt there was more risk in not acting than by going ahead.

18. The President replied that he wanted carefully to consider this whole problem. He recognized the difference between speeches and action but said the implications of action are more important than speeches. He was concerned as to what we would do if we lost more planes. He said he thought we had been acting with Souvanna Phouma's full support and that he was disturbed what Ambassador Unger, whom he understood to be a very effective expert on the scene, had said. He then asked why it was necessary to dispatch the planes from South Vietnam, whether it would not be better to have the Navy handle it and thereby not involve South Vietnam in possible North Vietnamese reactions. General Wheeler commented that there would be no difference. Mr. McNamara said that he had decided to give the assignment to the Air Force as he considered the Air Force better qualified in this type of operation, and that he had received criticism from General LeMay of the way in which the Navy handled the operation yesterday.

19. The President then asked General Carter's views. General Carter commented that in the meeting before the President arrived he had expressed the feeling that the mission should be postponed for twenty-four to forty-eight hours, until we could have a full exchange of views with Ambassador Unger and more time to see where we are headed. He understood that Mr. McCone had agreed to the mission, however. He felt that the timing was wrong and that we were flailing away in reaction to the loss of the planes, rather than following a considered course of action. He also expressed concern at the prospect of losing our friends in the course of this activity. He said he did not have an alternate course of action to suggest at the moment and that he fully recognized the remarks of the Secretary about the danger of talking tough and acting weakly. He would, however, suggest that a two to three day delay would not be critical in impressing Hanoi.

20. It being clear that the missions were about to launch in the absence of word to the contrary, the President determined that they should go ahead as scheduled. He commented that he still had some doubts but that he approved the present plan.

Chester L. Cooper  
Assistant Deputy Director (Intelligence)  
(Policy Support)

William E. Colby  
Chief, Far East Division

cc: DDCI

Attachments:

EMBTEL-1559 (Vetn)  
EMBTEL-1562 (Vetn)

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Agenda for meeting June 5, 1964, at 6:00 P.M.

1. Next steps in South Vietnam (TAB 1)
2. Next steps in relation to Laos (TAB 2)
3. Outline information program (TAB 3)

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MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION ON FRIDAY, JUNE 5, 6 PM

LAOS

The enemy has two choices in Laos, each with a number of shadings.

First, he can at any time initiate substantial military action on the ground aiming toward the Mekong Valley.

Second, he can try to keep what he has for the present and leave any military initiative to us. This is our major problem.

I. Action if the enemy moves strongly toward the Mekong.

While we rate its likelihood very low (less than one in ten) we must obviously be prepared for this first case -- substantial enemy pressure toward the Mekong. In this case we believe that it would be necessary to be prepared to move U. S. and other forces [ ] at once and to be prepared, [ ] to occupy selected Laotian cities on the left bank of the Mekong. This of course would imply a still sharper de facto partition of Laos, but since it would by definition be a response to clear-cut Communist military aggression, we believe it would be internationally and nationally acceptable -- and indeed almost inevitable.

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Our recommendation is that contingency planning against this possibility should be undertaken at once [ ] and we believe that military discussions of this contingency will have a useful diplomatic effect in Thailand, Laos and North Vietnam.

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II. Politico-Military Scenario if there is no further major Communist movement in Laos.

The second enemy choice poses us a more complicated problem. In essence our objectives are three:

(1) not to let the situation develop so rapidly that we are faced with a choice of humiliation or major military action before we are ready to take decisions in the context of SEA and especially SVN.

(2) not to lose whatever prospect there is of maintaining a Souvanna government and at least a nominal maintenance of the political status quo in Laos.

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(3) not to permit a diplomatic "victory" for neutralism and Communism which would reflect heavily against our position and that of our friends in SVN and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

Our belief is that the following politico-military scenario is the best available for these purposes. By a minimum of force, and an absence of direct hostile action unless they shoot first, it aims to show

(1) Our determination

(2) Our readiness for peace

(3) More specifically, our continued dedication to the Geneva Accords and especially to the Souvanna government.

1. The Article IV consultations. These are proceeding in Vientiane now and we should do our best to string them out and to wring out of them a sharp picture of Pathet Lao aggression in the Plain of Jars. The Article IV consultations are limited to our friends and include neither French nor Communist representation. They have their value and it should not be we who bring them to an end. But already pressure is very high for the next step which is likely to be the Polish Proposal.

Rec. 2. We recommend continuation of the consultations in Vientiane, exploitation of the evidence they produce, and readiness to move to the Polish proposals at the latest workable time.

At this stage our military pressure consists of fairly regular reconnaissance flights over the Plain of Jars and over Southern Laos, together with high-level U-2 reconnaissance over North Vietnam.

Rec. 3 We recommend that these programs continue.

2. The Polish Meeting. We are in favor of the Polish proposal for discussion among the British and Soviet Co-Chairmen, the ICC Members (Canada, India and Poland), and representatives of the three parties in Laos.

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It remains our position that the pre-conditions for any Geneva conference are as stated by Souvanna -- cease-fire and withdrawal to previous positions, acceptance of Souvanna's position and powers, re-establishment of the Souvanna government of National Unity, and effective functioning of the International Control Commission. We must hold this stand strongly, less for the sake of our own prestige than for the protection of Souvanna's position vis-a-vis his Right Wing, and the position of the Khanh Government in South Vietnam. We do not suppose that these conditions will be accepted in toto, but we do not at all exclude the possibility of real progress toward them if we follow the program set out below.

In one form or another the Polish discussions are likely to occur within the next week or two. Under proper conditions these meetings can be useful in gaining time. Nevertheless, it is most unlikely that these discussions will produce any substantial result, and when they reach an impasse, they will be stronger calls than ever for a new Geneva conference.

We therefore believe it important that the Polish meetings be accompanied by additional military signals on our side to underline our determination to insist on a certain degree of Communist pull-back before a Geneva meeting is held.

The best available military indicator for this purpose is the extension of present U. S. low-level reconnaissance over Laos into North Vietnam along supply lines feeding the Plain of Jars and the Laotian corridor toward South Vietnam.

Rec. 4 We recommend the initiation of such low-level reconnaissance at about the time of a Polish meeting.

Rec. 5 We recommend further that if such planes are downed either over Laos or North Vietnam, fighter escort should be provided with instructions to return ground fire and attack anti-aircraft installations.

3. Impasse in the Polish meetings. The actions recommended to this point are those which would occur before an impasse in the Polish discussions. When such an impasse has been reached, we expect to recommend selections from the following additional actions to strengthen our general position. No specific decisions are recommended at present, but such actions might include the following:

(1) The expansion of T-28 operations in Laos, including the use of third country pilots, but not Americans.

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(2) The introduction of harassing action by South Vietnamese forces into the Laotian Corridor (with U. S. advisors).

(3) The authorization of South Vietnamese air strikes against North Vietnamese activities in the Laotian corridor.

(4) A number of movements of U. S. forces from our West Coast toward the West Pacific in ways that will increase our readiness posture and give a general warning signal. These numbers might be selected from among the following:

- a. 1 Army Brigade to Philippines from Hawaii (5 to 12 days)
- b. 1 Army Brigade to Okinawa from Hawaii (5 to 12 days)
- c. Reassign carrier task force from Pacific Coast to South China Sea (2 weeks)
- d. 10 fighter squadrons CONUS to Philippines or WestPac (2 to 10 days)
- e. 1 Marine Division and Air Wing (22,900 men) CONUS to Okinawa (40 days)
- f. 1 Infantry Division (11,500 men) CONUS to Hawaii (45 days)

4. Political steps after a Polish impasse.

Our present belief is that after an impasse is reached in the Polish discussions, the next step politically should probably be discussion in the UN. Such discussion need not necessarily be limited to Laos, and at this stage we might well wish a general discussion of the threats to peace in Southeast Asia in the UN forum.

We believe it important to have in reserve additional military deployments, warning of which might properly be given in the UN debate. It is possible that on further discussion some of the actions listed above might be withheld for this purpose, but our preliminary thinking has been that the most valuable item in this context would be the deployment of U. S. ground forces, of about 5,000 men to Thailand.

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It is our current belief that this general politico-military scenario could be expected to last about a month to six weeks, and that at the end of that time further action should be closely related to our wider planning for South Vietnam and Southeast Asia as a whole.

III. The Special Problem of the Laotian Right

One continuing danger, in all our Laotian efforts, is the Right Wing. Both the relatively skillful Phoumi and the quite unpredictable Siho are capable of acting to overthrow Souvanna and take power at Vientiane at any time. De facto, they have much power there now. Any Right Wing takeover would be most destructive to our whole position.

Rec. 6 We recommend that Ambassador Unger continue to use all appropriate diplomatic pressures to prevent any such takeover, including the specific warning that the U. S. would not support those executing such a coup. At the same time, we must avoid as far as possible action which might trigger such a Right Wing reaction. This is one important reason for keeping the finger of accusation pointed at the Communists and avoiding a Geneva conference which tacitly accepts the status quo in the Plain of Jars.

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I. Strengthen the situation within SVN by:

A. Expanding the U.S. and Vietnamese activities in the 8 Critical Provinces.

1. Move in additional Vietnamese troops.
2. Assign control over all troops in each of the provinces to the province chiefs.
3. Develop detailed hamlet by hamlet "oil spot" and "clear and hold" operational plans for each of the approximately 40 districts.
4. Introduce a system of population control (curfews; identification papers; intelligence network; etc.)
5. Increase the provincial police force.
6. Expand the information program (introduce approximately 40,000 radios; install transmitters at provincial capitals; provide taped programs; etc.).
7. Develop a special economic aid program for each province (distribution of medicines; school construction materials; etc.).
8. Add additional U.S. personnel (initially from within SVN):
  - a. 320 military provincial and district advisers.
  - b. 40 USOM provincial and district advisers.
  - c. 74 battalion advisers (2 for each of 37 bns.)
9. Transfer military personnel to fill existing and future USOM shortages where necessary (110 to 180 men).
10. Establish joint US-GVN teams to monitor the program at both the national and provincial levels.

B. Intensifying the information program within the country.

1. Distribute between 100,000 and 200,000 radio receivers.
2. Increase the quantity and quality of in-country radio programs including "fireside" chats, etc.

C. Strengthen the administration of the Country Team.

D. Actions not taken:

1. Lodge opposed:
  - a. A shift from a government of politicians to a government of technicians.
  - b. A shift in the U.S. role from one of "advice" to one of "direction".
  - c. Removal of dependents unless accompanied by military moves.
  - d. "Interlacing" of U.S. personnel within the national and provincial governments.

II. Near-term Forecast.

- A. The actions referred to above will have little or no effect within the next 3 to 6 months.
- B. At best, during that period, the situation will jog along about as it is (assuming Khanh is not assassinated) -- it may continue to deteriorate slowly.

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C. Because visible improvement is unlikely, we can expect increasing criticism of U.S. policy and U.S. operations by the public and by our allies.

III. U. S. Information Program.  
To offset the expected criticism and to develop the "peace offense" theme (with members of Congress; the press; the public; foreign diplomats; etc.)

IV. Congressional Resolution.  
About mid-July consider requesting a Congressional Resolution supporting U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.

V. Strike against North Vietnam.

A. Continue to prepare political and military plans for such operations, recognizing that all efforts to achieve our objective by peaceful means must be exhausted before military action is undertaken. It is unlikely that a strike against the north would be desirable at any time within the next 3 to 6 months, although this estimate may be affected by events in Laos.

B. Carry on a dialogue with the DRV through the Canadians.

C. Initiate joint military planning with the Thais.

VI. Military pressures short of combat operations.

A. Periodically review a list of military moves designed to demonstrate the U.S. intention to prevent further communist advances in Southeast Asia and determine whether any of such moves are timely (see list attached.)

(see attached list)

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Illustrative Military Moves Designed to Demonstrate the U.S. Intention to Prevent Further Communist Advances in Laos and South Vietnam

1. Continue high and low-level reconnaissance over Laos.
2. Continue high-level reconnaissance over DRV (20 flights per month).
3. Introduce GVN recon. teams into Laos (with or without U.S. advisors) - 4 approx. 6/15; 16 by 8/15.
4. Authorize hot-pursuit into Cambodia.
5. Initiate selective low-level recon. into DRV along supply lines feeding the Laotian corridor.
6. Re-introduce a MAG into Laos (shift from Thailand).
7. Re-introduce White Star teams into Laos - (15 teams in 20 days).
8. Introduce GVN harassing forces into Laotian corridor (with or without U.S. advisors) - 60 days.
9. Send 500 additional military advisors to SVN to expand the counter-insurgency program (announce immediately; complete in 120 days).
10. Expand T-28 operations in Laos, then use of U.S. military pilots.
11. Accompany U.S. recon. flights over Laos with fighter escort.
12. Authorize VNAF air strikes against DRV activities in Laotian corridor.
13. U.S. Force movements:
  - a. 1 or 2 B-57 squadrons into SVN - 24 hours.
  - b. 1 interceptor squadron into SVN - 24 hours.
  - c. 1 or 2 fighter squadrons into Thailand - 24 hours.
  - d. 1 Army Brigade (5150 men) into Thailand (5 to 12 days)
  - e. 1 Marine Brigade and Air Group (5700 men and 40 aircraft) into SVN on exercise or assignment (8 days).
  - f. 1 Army Brigade to Philippines from Hawaii (5 to 12 days)
  - g. 1 Army Brigade to Okinawa from Hawaii (5 to 12 days).
  - h. Reassign carrier task force from Pacific Coast to South China Sea (2 weeks).
  - i. 10 fighter squadrons CONUS to Philippines or WestPac (2 to 10 days).
  - j. 1 Marine Division and Air Wing (22, 900 men) CONUS to Okinawa (40 days).
  - k. 1 Infantry Division (11, 500 men) CONUS to Hawaii (45 days).

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June 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION ON FRIDAY, JUNE 5, 6 PM

OUTLINE INFORMATION PROGRAM

Part One - Information-psychological program in South Vietnam

The Honolulu meeting recommends <sup>a</sup>major program mounted in Saigon

- A. To improve morale and zeal in South Vietnam
- B. To carry the story to North Vietnam
- C. To better inform Americans and our allies.

This program rests on two basic propositions:

1. That there is no substitute for some real victories, and that the current bad situation is the main source of bad reports.

2. Even so, a much more effective program can be built if everyone at all levels puts his mind on it.

A. The following steps are recommended in South Vietnam:

1. Heavy support to building an image of leadership in the Khanh Government, to include more talks by Khanh, wider distribution of radio receivers, and inclusion of other government leaders.

2. Add U.S. advisers for information and propaganda with every unit in the field to watch alertly for Viet Cong atrocities and mistakes and bravery by government soldiers, so as to report and exploit both kinds of action.

3. Explore possibilities of rewards for heroic South Vietnamese soldiers.

4. Prepare for a start in land reform in the delta. (Hardly an information matter but obviously important.)

5. Expand CIA propaganda teams in the villages.

6. Explore additional role for U. S. youth in South Vietnam.

7. Add other more sophisticated propaganda steps.

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B. Propaganda directed to the North

It is recommended that this element of the program should be built mainly on the efforts listed above for South Vietnam plus advice and guidance for South Vietnamese programming to the North.

C. Information to Americans and their allies

This is the most difficult but perhaps the most important problem. The following actions are recommended:

1. Drastic action to improve credibility of U. S. spokesmen in South Vietnam. U. S. Government, especially military, are no longer believed cause of past misinformation, and a new information directive and new personnel are needed.
2. A single individual should have cross-the-board authority under the Ambassador. It is now agreed that Barry Zorthian of USIA is the right man for this job.
3. Transportation for newsmen should be improved.
4. The quality of military public information officers should be drastically improved.
5. The military should launch a more vigorous internal education program for soldiers who often now "sound off" to the press in such a way that press reports then make the soldiers' task more difficult.
6. Finally, it is the committee's general recommendation that every effort be made by the Ambassador and all hands to press the GVN to a greater awareness of information and propaganda problems.

Part Two - Information and Propaganda in Washington

1. It is recommended that all information and propaganda work relating to Southeast Asia be coordinated under a single officer holding appointment as consultant to the NSC. Mr. Robert Manning is recommended for this appointment. There is a certain risk in having any officer with this responsibility but the need for coordination outweighs the danger.

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2. A detailed program should be developed under Mr. Manning's own guidance, but the following sketch indicates the range of his work.

He must coordinate information:

To: The Congress  
The diplomatic world  
Publishers and editors  
Reporters  
TV and all other opinion leaders

From: The President and Cabinet  
The U.S. military and political leaders in the Pacific  
Soldiers and civilians with service in Vietnam  
Vietnamese spokesmen  
Independent observers who see the real situation

About: The situation and the issue in SVN  
The overall struggle for SEA  
The policy of the US -- peace, determination and effectiveness

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